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Abstract 
In this paper we prove that perfect graphs are kernel solvable, as it was conjectured by Berge 
and Duchet (1983). The converse statement, i.e. that kernel-solvable graphs are perfect, was also 
conjectured in the same paper, and is still open. In this direction we prove that it is always 
possible to substitute some of the vertices of a non-perfect graph by cliques so that the resulting 
graph is not kernel solvable. 
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1. Introduction and main results 
A directed graph D = (V,A) is called a superorientation of the simple graph 
G = (V,E), if D is obtained from G by orienting all of its edges in an arbitrary 
way (for some or for all of the edges (u,v) E E both arcs uv and vu may be in- 
cluded in A). 
A subset S C_ V of the vertices of a directed graph D = (V, A) is called a kernel, if it 
is a stable set and every vertex outside of S has a successor in S (i.e. if no arc u--~E A 
has both endpoints in S, and for every u ~ S there exists a v E S such that u~E A). 
Let us note that if S is a kernel of a superorientation f G, then S is a maximal stable 
set of G. 
We shall say that a clique C of G has a kernel in a superorientation D of G, if 
there is a vertex v E C, which is the successor of all other vertices of C. Let us finally 
call a graph G kernel solvable if for every superorientation D of G for which every 
clique has a kernel, D itself has a kernel. 
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Berge and Duchet studied kernels and kernel solvability (solvability), and conjectured 
that kernel solvability is equivalent with perfectness. More precisely, the following two 
conjectures were stated in [5]. 
Conjecture 1. Perfect graphs are kernel solvable. 
Conjecture 2. Kernel solvable graphs are perfect. 
The first conjecture was proved for some special cases, including Gallai graphs in 
[23], line graphs in [24], and complements of strongly perfect graphs in [7]. Conjecture 
2 was also shown to hold for line graphs in [24]. 
The main result of this paper is to prove the first conjecture, and give a partial 
answer for the second. 
Theorem 1. Perfect 9raphs are kernel solvable. 
We shall call a graph G ~ = (V' ,E')  a blow-up of G = (V,E), if it is obtained 
from G by substituting some of the vertices by cliques, i.e. if there are subsets 
CoCV'  for v E V such that CunCo = ~ i fu  ¢ v, V' = Uvevcv, and (x,y) E 
E p for x E Cu and y E Co if and only if u = v or (u,v) E E. It was proved 
in [21] that if G is perfect then every blow-up G p of it is perfect, too. Thus, ac- 
cording to Theorem 1, any blow-up G ~ of a perfect graph G is kernel solvable. 
In the converse direction, as a partial answer for Conjecture 2, we can prove the 
following. 
Theorem 2. I f  the 9raph G is not perfect, then there exists a blow-up G ~ of G, which 
is not kernel solvable. 
In the next section we introduce a property of graphs, the so-called core solvability, 
and prove that it is equivalent with kernel solvability. 
Since the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 rely heavily on results of game theory, we 
introduce the necessary notions and results in Section 3. In Section 4 we show that 
core solvability of a graph G is equivalent to the stability of an associated effectivity 
function ga. 
In Section 5 we show that perfectness of a graph G is equivalent with the g-stability 
of the associated family 3((a of coalitions. 
The connection between the two types of stability, shown in Section 6, enables us 
to prove Theorems 1 and 2. A key ingredient in our proof is a result of [16] which is 
relatively hard to access. Therefore, we included an independent proof for Theorem l
in Section 7, based on a result of [11] (see also [12, 13]). 
In Section 8 we give an overview of the used notions, their relations, and summarize 
the main results of the paper. For the definitions see Section 3, and the beginning of 
Sections 2 and 4. 
In Section 9 we show further properties of kernel solvable graphs, and formulate 
new conjectures, equivalent with Conjecture 2. Finally, in Section 10 we state a general 
criterion for g-stability of hypergraphs. 
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2. Sub-orientations and Core Solvability 
A directed graph D = (V,A) is called a suborientation of the simple graph G : 
(V, E), if  D is obtained from G by orienting some of  the edges of G (for the sake 
of  simplicity we shall assume that no edge is bidirected in a suborient- 
ation). 
Let us note that there is an obvious one-to-one correspondence between sub- and 
superorientations of a simple graph G ----- (V,E). In a superorientation f  G edges can be 
uniquely or both ways oriented, while in a suborientation they can be uniquely or not 
at all oriented. Clearly, interchanging the operations 'both way orient' and 'not orient 
at all' will establish a one-to-one correspondence b tween sub- and superorientations of 
G. For the clarity, let us say that a superorientation D + : (V,A +) and a suborientation 
D-  = (V,A- )  of G are correspondinq, i f A -  C_ A +, and denoting the set of edges 
of  G which are uniquely (and in the same way) oriented in both directed graphs 
by E 1 = {(u,v)[ u~E A-}  we have A + : A -  U {~v,vu  ~ I(u,v) E E \E1} ,  i.e. 
edges belonging to E \ E 1 are not oriented in D- ,  and are both way oriented in 
O +" 
Let us now fix a suborientation D : (V,A) of the graph G = (V,E). We shall say 
that a vertex v rejects (in D) a stable set S C V if ~vE A for all edges (u, v) E E for 
which u E S. We shall call a suborientation D of G rejectin9 i f  every stable set of 
G is rejected (in D) by some vertex. (Let us note that a non-maximal stable set S is 
always rejected by any of the vertices v ~ S for which S U {v} is also stable.) Finally, 
let us call a suborientation of  G clique acyclic i f  it does not contain a directed cycle 
inducing a clique of G. 
Let us observe the following easy relations. 
Lemma 3. Let D + = (V,A +) and D-  = (V,A- )  be a corresponding pair of super- 
and suborientations of a simple graph G-  (V,E). Then 
(i) D- is rejectin9 if and only if D + has no kerne# 
(ii) D- is clique acyclic if and only if every clique of G has a kernel in D +. 
Proof. (i) If  a vertex v rejects in D-  a maximal stable set S, then, by definition, every 
edge of G between S and v are oriented uniquely toward v both in D-  and D +. Hence, 
v has no successor from S in D +, i.e. S cannot be a kernel of  D +. This implies that if 
D -  is rejecting, i.e. if  every maximal stable set of G is rejected by at least one vertex 
in D- ,  then none of  the maximal stable sets are kernels of D +. 
For the converse direction, let us observe that if a maximal stable set S is not a 
kernel in D +, then there must exist a vertex v ~ S which has no successor in S, i.e. 
for which all the edges between S and v are directed uniquely toward v (there are such 
edges, since S is a maximal stable set). Then, all these edges appear with the same 
orientation in D- ,  too, and hence v rejects S in D- .  
(ii) Let C = {v0,vl ..... Vs} be the vertex set of a directed cycle in D-  inducing 
a clique of G. Let us say vivi+lE A -  for i = 0,...,s - 1 and VsVoE A- .  Then, since 
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Fig. 1. Clique acyclic rejecting suborientations f odd holes and anti-holes. 
A-  CA + and no edge appearing in A -  is oriented both ways in A +, none of the vertices 
of  C is the successor of  all the other, i.e. C has no kernel. 
On the other hand, if D -  induces an acyclic subgraph on a clique C of  G, then there 
exists a vertex v E C which has no successor in C in D- .  Such a vertex obviously is 
the successor of  all other vertices of  C in D +. [] 
A simple graph G will be called core solvable if it has no clique acyclic rejecting 
suborientation. It follows from the previous lemma that core solvability and kernel 
solvability are equivalent. 
Corollary 4. A simple graph is kernel  solvable i f  and only i f  it is core solvable. [] 
Example 1. Let us consider odd holes and odd anti-holes. Let V = {v0,vl . . . . .  Vn--I }, 
where n is an odd integer, let 
E = {(vi, vi+2mod n)]i ---- 0 ..... n - 1}, 
and let 
E'  = {(vi, vi+,mod n) l i  = O, 1 ..... n - 1, 2 <~ s <~ n - 2}. 
Then, G = (V ,E )  is an odd hole, and G I = (V ,E  ~) is an odd anti-hole. Let us define 
now 
A = {v--~.vi+2mod n li = 0 ..... n - 1}. 
Then, it is easy to verify that D = (V,A) is a rejecting, clique acyclic suborientation 
of  both G and G t (see Fig. 1). 
Let us remark that while odd holes have a unique clique acyclic rejecting subori- 
entation, odd anti-holes may have several, non-isomorphic ones. As an example let us 
consider the suborientation of  C7 given in Fig. 2. This suborientation is clique acyclic, 
rejecting, and non-isomorphic to the one given in Fig. 1. 
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.......... Unoriented edge 
Fig. 2. Another clique acyclic rejecting suborientation of C7. 
3. Effectivity functions and stability 
In this section we introduce definitions and recall basic results from game theory. 
Let I denote the set of players and A denote the set of outcomes. Each player i E I 
has a set of  strategies denoted by X~, and let X = ×ictXi. A game is described by 
two mappings, g : X ~ A and u : I × A ~ ~. The mapping g (sometimes called 
a game form) specifies the outcome of the game for every possible combinations of 
the strategies of  the players. (Note that the mapping g is supposed to be surjective 
but not usually injective.) The real function u, called the utility (or payoff) describes 
the 'value' of an outcome for an individual player. Player i E I is said to prefer 
outcome al E A over a2 C A if u(i, al) > u(i, a2). We shall call in the sequel the 
quadruple (I,A,X,g) a game form, and the quintuple (l,A,X,g,u) a game in normal 
fol 'm. 
Subsets of  the players are called coalitions and subsets of the outcomes are called 
blocks. A coalition K C_ I is said to be effective for a block B C A if the players 
of  K can guarantee the outcome of the game to belong to B. This relation can be 
represented as a Boolean mapping ~ : 2 t × 2 A ~ {0, 1 } called an effectivity function, 
i.e. g(K,B) = 1 if and only if the coalition K is effective for the block B. We shall 
call the quadruple (I,A, g,u) a game in effectivity function form. Obviously, every 
game form F = (I,A,X,g) defines uniquely an effectivity function, denoted by Er by 
setting gr(K,B) = 1 for a coalition K c ! and a block B C_ A if and only if there are 
strategies yk E Ark for every k c K such that g(x) E B, for every x C X for which 
xk=yk ,  kEK .  
Clearly, given the set of players I and the set of outcomes A any Boolean mapping 
" 2 ! × 2 A ~ {0, 1 } can be considered as an effectivity function, but not all effectivity 
functions are generated by game forms. The following theorem of [25] characterizes 
which effectivity functions are corresponding to game forms. 
Theorem 5 (Moulin and Peleg [25]). A Boolean mapping g • 21 × 2 A --~ {0, 1 } is 
the effectivity function of a game form F if and only if 8 satisfies the following 
conditions." 
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Monotonicity." K CKtC_I, BCB'C_A and ~(K ,B)= 1 imply that 8(K ' ,B ' )= 1. 
Super-additivity." g(K1,B1) = 1, g(K2,B2) = 1 and K1 NK2 = 0 imply that g(K~ U 
K2,B1 AB2) = 1. 
Boundary conditions." g( l ,B)  = g(K,A) = 1 for all non-empty blocks B C A, and 
non-empty coalitions K C_ 1, furthermore g(l ,  O) = g(O, A)= 0. 
An effectivity function S can also be specified by explicitly listing all pairs of 
coalitions K and blocks B for which K is effective for B. Conversely, given a list 
T = ((Kj ,Bj) I j  C J), where J is a finite set of indices, KjC_I is a coalition and 
Bj C A is a block for j C J ,  let ~r  denote the effectivity function corresponding to T, 
i.e. g r (K ,B)  = 1 if and only if (K,B) = (Kj,Bj) for some j E J .  
Let us call an effectivity function S playable if there exists a game form F for 
which 8~<8r,  i.e. for which g(K,B) -- 1 implies gr(K,B) = 1. 
The following theorem of [ 16] provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
playability of an effectivity function. 
Theorem 6 (Gurvich and Vasin [16]). Let us consider an effectivity function gr  de- 
fined by the list T = ((Kj,Bj)I J  E J). Then the following properties are equivalent. 
(i) gr  is playable. 
(ii) For every subset J~ C_ J for which the corresponding coalitions are pairwise 
disjoint (i.e., Kj AKj, = O for every j , f  E J', j ~ j '),  the corresponding blocks have 
a non-empty intersection, i.e. nj~j,Bj ~ ~. 
Let us remark that Theorem 6 can be derived directly from Theorem 5. For com- 
pleteness, we include here a short proof. 
Proof. Let us assume first that ~ar is playable, i.e. 8 r  ~<~r for some game form F, 
and let J~C J  such that 8r(Kj ,Bj)  = 1 for all j E J ' ,  and Kj~ NKj: = 0 for all pairs 
j l  ~ j2  E j1. Then 8r(Kj,Bj)  -- 1 follows for all j E J1 by ¢r<~¢r. The effectivity 
function ~r  is monotone, superadditive and satisfies the boundary conditions, according 
to Theorem 5. Thus, ~r(U ju ,  Kj, (']j~g, Bj) = 1 follows by the superadditivity of ~r .  
This implies then (-]j~j, Bj ~ 0 since ~r( l ,O)= 0 and dr  is monotone. 
Let us assume next that Cr  satisfies (ii). Let us define C by setting 8~(K,B) = 1 
if there exists a non-empty index-subset J ' C J such that K ~ Uj~j, Kj, B ~_ (-]j~3, Bj, 
and the corresponding coalitions are pairwise disjoint (i.e. Kj, N Kj2 = ~ for every 
j l , j2 E J', jl ~j2) ,  or i fK  = I and B ~ 0, or i fB  --- A and K ~ 0. It is not difficult 
to check that the obtained effectivity function ¢ '  satisfies all conditions of Theorem 5, 
hence there exists a game form F for which ~ = ~r.  Since ~ ~>er follows by the 
definition of ~',  we can conclude that Cr  is playable. [] 
Let us now fix an effectivity function g : 21 ×2 A ~ {0, 1} and a utility u " I×,4 --~ ~. 
We shall say that a coalition K C_ I can reject an outcome a E A if there exists a block 
BC.4 such that E(K,B) ---- 1 and u(k,b) > u(k,a) for every player k C K and outcome 
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b E B. In other words, K can reject a if K is effective for a block B in which every 
outcome is strictly and unanimously prefered to a by all players of K. Let 
R(K,B) = {a E AIVk E KVb E B u(k,b) > u(k,a)}. (1) 
Given a family X c_ 2 t of  coalitions, the X-core of the game (I, A, g, u) in effectivity 
function form is defined as 
C(g,u, .~) = A \ U R(K,B). (2) 
K63F 
BCA 
g(K,B ) I 
Given the set of players I and the set of outcomes A an effectivity function g is 
called stable if C (g ,u ,2  I) ¢ 0 for every utility function u : I x A ~ ~. 
Given an effectivity function S, let us consider a table of triples R = ((Kj, Bj, 
Rj)Ij E J), where Kj C I, Bj CA, and R i CA  for all j E J .  We shall call R a rejecting 
table of ~, if g(Kj,Bj) = 1 and Rj N Bj = ~ for all j E J ,  and A = UjcjRj .  The 
ordered subset {jl,j2 ..... js} c J of the indices is called a common player cycle of the 
rejecting table R i fRj ,  n Bj,+, ¢ ~ for l = 1 ..... s - 1, Rj~ NBj~ ¢ ~3 and ~ ¢ N~_~ K/,. 
The following theorem of [ 18] characterizes stability of effectivity functions in terms 
of their rejecting tables. 
Theorem 7 (Keiding [18]). An effectivity function is stable if and only if" every re- 
jecting table of it contains a common player cycle. 
Given the set of players, I ,  a family X c_21 of coalitions is called g-stable if 
¢ C(~r,u, J{)  for every game F = ( l ,A ,X,g,u)  in normal form. 
Let us consider a family 0,5(" of coalitions, and a nonnegative integer valued weight 
function on it, w : X --* Z+. The function w is called a balanced weighting of X 
with multiplicity 6 if for every player i E I the equation 
w(K) = ~ (3)  
KEJ¢  
holds. The subfamily J~Fw = {K E •lw(K)  > 0} is called the support of w. A 
balanced weighting w with multiplicity 6 = 1 is called a partition weighting (or 
simply a partition), for the support Xw of such a weighting w is a partition of I. We 
shall say that a family X has property BSP (i.e. has the property that every balanced 
subfamily of X is partitionable), if every balanced weighting of .Yf is the non-negative 
integral combination of partitions. In other words, X has property BSP if and only if 
for every balanced weighting w : .%(" ~ 7/+ there are partitions w i : .X --~ {0, 1 } and 
non-negative integers ~i E 7/+,  i = 1 ..... l, such that w = ~-~I=1 ctiwi" Given a finite set 
S, let us denote finally by [S] the family of all one element subsets (singletons) of S, 
i.e. [S] = {{i}1i E S}. 
The following theorem of [16] (see also [28]) characterizes the g-stability of a family 
of coalitions. 
42 E. Boros, V. Gurvich/Discrete Mathematics 159 (1996) 35-55 
Theorem 8 (Gurvich and Vasin [16]). The family of coalitions of" is g-stable if and 
only if 3ff U [I] has property BSP. 
An effectivity function ~ : 2 t x 2 A --~ {0, 1} is called B-monotone if g(K,B) = 1 
and B ~ DB imply g(K,B ~) = 1. Let us call g balanced if for every partition 
A = U Di (4) 
iEl 
(i.e. where Di (q Dj = 0 whenever i ~ j, i, j E I) ,  and for every balanced weighting 
w : X --~ Z+ there exists a coalition K E 3ffw such that 
e(K, U D~) = o .  
i~K 
Balancedness of an effectivity function is a strong property, and according to the 
following theorem, it is essentially a sufficient condition for its stability (see [11-13]). 
Theorem 9 (Danilov and Sotskov [11]). B-monotone balanced effectivity functions are 
stable. 
We have to remark here that the above theorem was originally stated only for effec- 
tivity functions which are generated by game forms (see Theorem 5). The proof used in 
[11], however, is in fact valid for any B-monotone ffectivity function, as stated above. 
We also would like to point out that both theorems, 8 and 9, build heavily on a 
result by Scarf [27]. For a simplified proof of Theorem 8 see [8,9]. 
4. Effectivity functions of graphs 
Given a graph G = (V,E) we shall consider games in which players are maximal 
cliques, and outcomes are maximal stable sets. Let 16 and AG denote, respectively, 
the families of maximal cliques and maximal stable sets of G. For every vertex v let 
Kv C_ 16 denote the family of all maximal cliques of G containing v, and let By _ AG 
denote the family of all maximal stable sets of G which contain vertex v. Finally, let 
= {Kvlv E V}, TG = ((Kv,Bv) lv E V), and let ec  denote the effectivity function 
defined by To. 
Lemma 10. For every graph G the associated effectivity function gc is always playable. 
Proof. Indeed, the conditions of Theorem 6 are fulfilled. To see this let us consider 
an arbitrary subset W C_ V of the vertices, for which the coalitions Kw, w E W are 
pairwise disjoint. Clearly, W is a stable set of G. Let S be a maximal stable set of G 
which contains W. Then, S E Bw for all w E W, by the definition of the blocks By, 
v E V. This implies that 0 # MwovBw. [] 
E. Boros, ld GurvichlDiscrete Mathematics 159 (1996) 35-55 43 
Next we show that the core solvability of  G is equivalent o the stability of o~c. 
Lemma 11. A simple graph G is core solvable if and only if the associated effectivity 
function gG is stable. 
Proof. Let us assume first that o~o is not stable. Then by Theorem 7 there exists 
a rejecting table R = ((Kj,Bj,Rj)Ij E J) having no common player cycles. Let us 
observe first that gc(K ,B)  = 0 unless K = Kv and B = By for some v E V, by the 
definition of  Nc. This implies, by the definition of rejecting tables that J c V. Since 
the addition of triples (Kv,Bv,(3), v E V \ J  to R keeps R a rejecting table of o~c, we 
may assume J = V, as well. 
Let us define now an orientation A of some of the edges of  G as follows: For every 
maximal stable set S ERv, v E V and for every vertex u E S for which (u, v) E E let 
us include the arc uv E A. 
First, we claim that D = (V,A) is clique acyclic, thus in particular no edge 
of G is oriented both ways in D, and hence D is a clique acyclic suborientation of 
G. Let us assume, on the contrary, that {Vl,V2 ..... Vs} is a clique cycle, 
i.e. viVi+lE A for i = 1 .... s -  1 and vsvlE A, and {vl ..... vs}C V is a clique of G. 
Let C be a maximal clique of  G containing vertices vi, i = 1 ..... s. The existence 
of an arc vivj implies the existence of a maximal stable set S E R~ i containing vg, 
and hence (3 ~ B~, Cq R~j. Since C E Kvj, j = 1 ..... s, the above together would imply 
that {vl,v2 ..... Vs} is a common player cycle in R, a contradiction which proves the 
claim. 
We claim next that D = (V,A) is a rejecting suborientation of G. This is quite 
immediate, since R is a rejecting table, thus, for every maximal stable set S ~ Ac 
there exists a vertex v for which S ERv, and therefore, by the definition of the arcs 
in D, the set S is rejected at vertex v. Therefore, D is a clique acyclic rejecting 
suborienation of G, and thus G is not core solvable. 
For the converse direction, let us assume now that G is not core solvable. This 
implies that there exists a clique acyclic rejecting suborientation D = (V,A) of G. Let 
us define the collection Rv of maximal stable sets by including all those which are 
rejected at vertex v. Clearly, v ~ S for all S E R~,, and hence By f-/R~ = (3, v E V. 
Since every maximal stable set of G is rejected by D, AG = U~EV R~ holds, and thus 
R = ((Kv,Bo,R~,)Iv E V) is a rejecting table for gG. 
We claim that this rejecting table has no common player cycles, and thus it proves 
that gG is not stable. To see this claim, let us assume, on the contrary, that {vl ..... v~} 
forms a common player cycle, i.e. R~ A B~ ~ (3 for i = 1 ..... s - 1, Rv~ A B~., ¢ (3 and 
N~=1Kv ~¢ (3. The existence of maximal stable sets S E R~. A Bvj shows that vjv~E A, 
and hence {vl ..... vs} is a directed cycle in D = (V,A). The existence of a maximal 
clique C E AS=lKv~ shows that this cycle is a clique cycle, contradicting to the clique 
acyclicity of D. This contradiction proves the claim, and finishes the proof of the 
lemma. 
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Corollary 12. A graph G is kernel solvable if and only if the associated effectivity 
function SG is stable. 
Proof. It follows immediately by Corollary 4 and by Lemma 11. [] 
5. Perfectness and partitionable balanced families 
In this section we prove that perfectness of  a graph G is equivalent to the g-stability 
of  the associated family ~ of coalitions. The main technical result of  this section, 
Lemma 14, is essentially equivalent o a result of  [10, 14] about the integrality of  the 
fractional vertex packing polytope. For completeness and clarity we give a simple proof 
below. 
Let us observe first the following easy but helpful statement. 
Lemma 13. A family ~ C_ 2 s of subsets of S has property BSP if and only if for 
every balanced weighting w:~ ~ l_+ of ~ the support Ww = {H E ~ lw(H)  > 0} 
of w contains a partition of S. 
Proof. Let us assume first that W has property BSP. Then, by definition of  the BSP 
property, for every balanced weighting w : W ~ 2v+ there are positive integers c( i and 
S partitions w i : 3¢g ~ {0, 1}, i = 1 ..... s for some integer s, such that w --- ~i=1 cti w*. 
Then w(H)>~wi(H) for every subset H E W, and hence the partition ~1 = {H E 
WIw1(H) -- 1} is clearly included in the support Ww of w. 
Let us assume next that for every balanced weighting w : W ~ Z+ of W the support 
Ww = {H E WIw(H)  > 0} contains a partition :~ of S. Let us prove now by induction 
on the multiplicity of  balanced weightings that every balanced weighting is the sum of 
partitions. Clearly, if w is a balanced weighting with multiplicity 1, then it is a partition 
itself. So, let us assume that we already have shown this for balanced weightings with 
multiplicity not more than t r -  1, and let us consider a balanced weighting w : W ~ Z+ 
of multiplicity tr. Let us consider the weight function w I defined by w~(H) = w(H) - 1 
if H E ~ and w~(H) = w(H) otherwise, and define another weight function w" by 
setting w'(H)  = 1 if H E ~ and w'(H)  = 0 otherwise. Clearly, w = w t + w" and w" 
is a partition. It is also clear that w ~ is a balanced weighting with multiplicity a -  1. 
Hence, by our inductive assumption, w' is the sum of partitions. Thus, w = w ~ + w" 
is also the sum of partitions. [] 
Lemma 14. A graph G is perfect if and only if the family ~U[ IG]  has property BSP. 
Proof. Let us assume first that G is perfect. To prove that ~ffG U [IG] has property BSP 
it is enough, by Lemma 13, to show that the support of  every balanced weighting w 
contains a partition of IG. For this end, let us define W -- {v E Viw(Kv) > 0} and 
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let us consider the induced subgraph G' = (W,U) of G. Let us associate the weight 
z~, : w(K~) to v E W. Since G ~ is perfect, it contains a stable set S C_ W intersecting 
all maximum weight cliques of  G ~ (with respect o the weights z~, v E W, see [21]). 
Let us note first that the balancedness of w means, by definition that there exists a 
constant a > 0 such that 
= w({C}) + ~ w(X~) (5) 
vEC 
for every maximal cliques C of G. Let us observe now that for any maximal clique 
C E 16 of G, either the clique W n C is a maximum weight clique of G ~ (with respect 
to the weights z~, v E W), in which case C Cq S ¢ (~, or the inequality w({C}) > 0 
follows by (5). Let us define then J~ = {K~lv E S} U {{C} E [IG]}C n S = 13}. Clearly, 
;~ is a partition of IG and it is included in the support of w. 
Let us assume next that the family >'ffa U [la] has property BSP. To show that G is 
perfect it is enough to show that in any induced subgraph G ~ = (W,U) of G induced 
by W C V there is a stable set S C_ W which intersects all maximum cliques of G t (see 
[21]). To see this let us define first a weighting w of the family ~ U [ Id  by setting 
w(K~) = 1 for v E W, w(K~) = 0 for v E V\W and w({C}) = o ) (G ' ) - Iwnc I  for all 
maximal cliques C E IG, where co(G') is the size of the maximum clique in G ~. It is 
easy to see then that w is a balanced weighting of ~ U [Ic] of multiplicity co(G'). By 
Lemma 13 the support of w contains a partition 2~ ° of Ic. Let S = {v E VJKv E ;~}. 
Clearly S is a stable set and S _C W since w(K) > 0 must hold for every family K E ,~. 
If C E Ic is a maximal clique for which IW n c[ = then w({C}) -- 0 by the 
definition of w, thus C must be covered by some K~ E 2 ,  and hence v E C A S follows, 
showing that S intersects C. This proves that S intersects all maximum cliques of  G'. 
Since this holds for arbitrary induced subgraphs of G, it follows that G is perfect. [] 
Corollary 15. A graph G is perfect if and only if ~c, is g-stable. 
Proof. Follows immediately from Theorem 8 and Lemma 14. [Z 
Let us remark that the perfectness of a graph G is also known to be equivalent with 
the normality of the hypergraph ~ffa, see [22]. For the definition and further properties 
of normal hypergraphs see also [4]. 
Corollary 16. Given a graph G, the family ~ 0 [Ic] has property BSP if and only 
if ~ is normal 
Proof. Immediate by Lemma 14 and by Theorem 2 of [22]. [] 
6. Stability and g-stability in graphs 
We are ready now to connect he stability of ~c with the g-stability of ~v{~ for a 
graph G. 
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Lemma 17. Let G be a simple graph, ~ the associated effectivity function and 
the associated family of coalitions, as before. Then, if ~ is O-stab&, then ~ is 
stable. Furthermore, if ~ ,  is stable for every blow up G' of G, then ~ is g-stable. 
Proof. Let us assume first that 3f(c is o-stable. Since ~ is always playable by Lemma 
10, there exists a game form F = (Ic, AG, X,g) for which the corresponding effectivity 
function ~r is a majorant of ~G, i.e. gc ~<Sr. This implies by (2) that 
C(86 ,u ,~ ) ~ C(Sr, u, yifc) (6) 
holds for every utility function u : IG x A6 --* ~. Since gG(K,B) = 0 whenever 
K ~ ~,  by (2) it follows also that 
C(gG, u,2 la) = C(gc, u,~rc). (7) 
Since ~ffc is o-stable, the ~ffG-core C(gr, u,:,UG) of F is never empty. This implies by 
(6) and (7) that C(gc, u,2 la) ¢ 0 for all utility functions u, and thus proves that gG 
is stable. 
Let us assume next that ~ is not o-stable. We shall show that there exists a blow 
up G of G for which g~ is not stable. 
Since now ~ is not o-stable, there exists a finite game form F = (IG, A,X,g) (A ¢ 
At; in general), for which the ~-core  C(gr, u,o~ff~) is empty. Let us define now a 
new effectivity function g by setting g(K,B) = gr(K,B) whenever K E JOG, B_  A 
and let g(K,B)= 0 otherwise. Clearly, C(g,u,2 l~) = C( g, u, o~rG ) = C(gr, U,:)ff~)= 
0, and therefore g is not stable. Thus, by Theorem 7, there exists a rejecting table 
R = ((Kj,Bj, Rj)[j E J) of g having no common player cycles, i.e. g(Kj,Bj) = 1, 
B: fq Rj = 0 for j E J ,  and Uj~jRj = A. Since g(K,B) = 0 for K ~ ~ffG, all the 
coalitions Kj, j E J must belong to ~.  Since the inclusion of triples (Kv, A,O) in R 
is not changing the fact that R is a rejecting table of g, we may assume as well that 
Kv = Kj for at least one index j E J for every vertex v E V. 
Let us consider now the intersection graph G = (J,b?) of the family {KjIj E J}, i.e. 
(jl,j2) E E exactly when Kj, NK:: ¢ O. Clearly, G is a blow-up of G. Let us associate 
now to any maximal stable set S of G an outcome as E A as follows: The coalitions 
K:, j E S are pairwise disjoint, because S is a stable set of G. Therefore, fqj~sBj ¢ 0 
follows by Theorem 6, since g is a playable effectivity function by its definition. 
Let us choose then as E Aj~sBj arbitrarily. It follows from this definition that every 
B/ (j E J )  contains all outcomes as associated to maximal stable sets of G which 
contain j. It follows also that if as E Rj for some maximal stable set S C_ J and vertex 
jE J ,  then j~S.  
Let us define then an orientation D = (J,A) of the edges of G, by including all arcs 
lj EA for all l E S and j E J for which as E RjLand ( j , l )  E b?. We shall show that 
is a clique acyclic rejecting suborientation of G, which will conclude the proof of 
the theorem. 
Exactly as in the proof of Lemma 11 we show first that any clique cycle {j~ ..... j~} 
of D corresponds to a common player cycle of R. Since R has no common player 
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cycles, it will follow that D is clique acyclic, and in particular that its edges are not 
oriented both ways, thus it is a clique acyclic suborientation of G. 
To see this let C be a clique cycle of G containing vertices {jl ..... js}. Then, since 
is a blow-up of G, the corresponding maximal clique C of G must belong to each 
coalition Kj, l = 1 ..... s, thus they have a common player. From the definition of the 
N 
arcs of D it follows that, if there is an arc lj EA, then there exists a maximal stable 
set S of G for which as C Rj (1 BI. These imply that {jl ..... js} is a common player 
cycle of R. 
Let us show finally that D is a rejecting suborientation of G. Again, just as in the 
proof of Lemma 11, this follows immediately from the definition: For any maximal 
stable set S of G the corresponding outcome as is rejected by some coalitions Kj, (i.e. 
as E Rj), since R is a rejecting table, and thus S is rejected at vertex j E J of G by 
the definition of arcs of D. 
Thus, we can conclude that the blow up G of G is not core solvable, since we could 
construct a clique acyclic rejecting suborientation D of it. Therefore, d~ is not stable 
by Lemma 11. [] 
Using the above lemma, we can now prove our main theorems. 
Proof of Theorem 1. If  G is a perfect graph, then J~f'6 is g-stable by Corollary 15, 
therefore, ~c is stable by Lemma 17. Thus, G is kernel solvable by Corollary 12. [] 
Proof of Theorem 2. If G is not perfect, then ~G is not g-stable by Corollary 15, 
therefore there exists a blow up G of G, for which ~ is not stable by Lemma 17. 
Then, by Corollary 12, the blow up G is not kernel solvable. [] 
7. Another proof for Theorem 1 
In this section we present an altemative proof for Theorem 1, based on Theorem 9. 
Let us consider a graph G = (V,E) as before, and let us denote by ~c the 
B-monotone xtension of ~ ,  i.e. ~6(K,B) ---- 1 iff K = K~ and B~_B~ for some 
vertex vE  V, o r i fB=Ac andK¢0.  
We prove first that the balancedness of ~c is equivalent to the perfectness of G. 
Lemma 18. The effectivity function ~c is balanced if and only if the graph G is 
perfect. 
Proof. Let us assume first that G is not perfect, and let W C_ V be a subset of vertices 
for which the induced subgraph G' = Glw is minimally non-perfect. 
Let us define now a balanced weighting w : 2 t~ ~ Z+ of the coalitions as follows: 
let w(K~) = 1 for all v E W, let w({i}) = ~o(G t) - [i N W I for all maximal cliques 
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i E Ic ,  and let w(K) = 0 for all other coalitions K _C IG. Clearly, w is a balanced 
weighting with multiplicity a -- co(G'). 
Let us define next a partition AG = UietG Di, Di N Dj ---- 0 for all i ~ j, i,j E 16. 
Since G ~ is minimally imperfect, for every stable set S~C W there exists a maximum 
clique C p C W of G ~ for which S t n C p = 0 (see e.g. [26]). This implies that for every 
maximal stable set S E A6 there exists a maximal clique i E 16, which is a maximum 
clique of the induced subgraph G', i.e. for which li n WI -- co(a'), and which has no 
common point with S in W, i.e. for which i M W N S = 0. Let S E Di for such a clique 
i EIG. 
We claim that with these definitions 
~c(K, U Di) = 1 (8) 
i~K 
for every coalition for which w(K) > 0, implying thus that ~c  is not balanced. To 
see this end, let us observe that if w(K) > 0 for a coalition then either K = Kv for 
some vertex v E W, or K = {i} for some maximal clique i E IG. 
In the first case, i n S ~ 0 for every stable set S E By and for every clique i E Kv, 
and thus by the definition of Dis we have S ~ Di. Hence, Ui(tKv Di ~-Bv follows, and 
thus (8) holds. 
In the second case, w({i}) > 0 implies l in W I < co(G ~) by the definition of  w, and 
thus Di = ~ by the definition of  the partition. Hence, Uj¢U } Di = It and (8) follows 
by the definition of B-monotonicity. 
Let us assume secondly that G is perfect. To show that ~G is balanced it is enough 
to prove that for any balanced weighting w and for any partition AG = Ui~l~ D~ there 
exists a coalition K E fflw = {K C Itiw(K) > 0} for which 
~G(K, U Di) = 0. (9) 
i¢K 
To this end let us consider a balanced weighting w and a partition At = Ui~lG Di 
of the outcomes, and let us define W = {v E V]w(Kv) > 0}. Since G is perfect by 
our assumption ow, the induced subgraph G t = G]w is perfect, too. 
Let us observe that if there exists an i E K, D i ~ 0 for a coalition K for which 
w(K) > 0 and K ¢ Kv for any v E W, then Uif[K Di ~ At, and thus (9) follows for 
this K. 
I f  there is no such i E K, then D i ~ 0 implies 
w(K~) = a, 
vEinw 
where ~ denotes the common multiplicity of cliques in the balanced weighting w. In 
other words, Di ~ 0 is possible only for cliques i E Ic  for which i n W is a maximum 
weight clique of  G' with respect o the weights w(Kv) associated to the vertices v E W. 
Since G' is perfect, there exists in this case a stable set S' C_ W which intersects all 
maximum weight cliques of G ~ (see e.g. [21]), and thus for any maximal stable set S 
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of G for which S N W = S', S C Di implies S N i N W ~ 0. Let v E S N i A W be an 
arbitrary vertex now. For this vertex v Uj¢K, Dj ~_ By, and thus (9) holds again. 
Since the above could be repeated for any balanced weighting and for any partition 
of the outcomes, the balancedness of ~c follows by the definition. [] 
Second proof of Theorem 1. If G is a perfect graph, then ~c is balanced by Lemma 
18 and thus ~c is stable by Theorem 9. Since C(~c,u,21c)C (g~,u,2 t ' )  holds for 
every utility functions u by (2), the stability of gc is implied, too, and thus the kernel 
solvability of G follows by Corollary 12. [] 
Let us remark that for Theorem 1 a third, much shorter proof was found recently 
by R. Aharoni and R. Holzman [1]. 
8. Summary of results 
In this section we summarize the obtained results to give an overview of the various 
notions and their relations. 
Corollary 19. Let G = (V,E)  be a graph, and let us consider the following proper- 
ties: 
(a) G is perfect; 
(b) okc is balanced," 
(c) Y{~ U [lc] has property BSP; 
(d) 3ffc is g-stable; 
(e) 3fo is norma# 
(f) gc is stable," 
(g) G is core solvable; 
(h) G is kernel solvable. 
Then we have 
(a) ¢==~ (b) ¢=~ (e) ~ (d) -', ,'- (e) ~ ( f )  -~ ;- (g) -,' ;- (h). 
Proof. In the first group the equivalences can be seen as follows: Property (a) is 
equivalent to (b) by Lemma 18, (a) ¢==~ (c) follows by Lemma 14, (c) ¢=~ (e) 
follows by Corollary 16, and (c) -', ',, (d) is implied by Theorem 8. 
The second group of equivalences follow, in this order, from Lemma 11 and 
Corollary 4. 
Finally, the implication between the two groups follows from Lemma 17. 
9. Further properties of kernel solvable graphs 
Let us remark first that the notion of rejecting suborientation can slightly be gener- 
alized, yielding a stronger characterization f kernel solvability than Corollary 12. 
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Let us consider a directed graph D -- (V,A), a simple graph G = (V,E), and a subset 
W c_ V. Let Dive and Give denote the induced subgraphs of D and G, respectively, 
furthermore, let Alve CA and Eive C E denote the subset of arcs and edges, respectively, 
which have both endpoints in W. It is clear that if D is a suborientation of G, then for 
every subset W c_ V, Dive is a suborientation of Give. Let us call a suborientation D = 
(V,A) of G = (V,E) minimal if it is rejecting, and if there is no proper subset W C V 
for which DIw is a rejecting suborientation of Give. Let us call the suborientation D 
strongly rejecting if every stable set S of G is rejected in D by some vertex v for 
which S U {v} is not stable. 
Lemma 20. Every minimal suborientation is strongly rejecting. 
Proof. Let D = (V,A) be a minimal suborientation of G = (V,E), and let us assume 
indirectly that S C V is a stable set which is not rejected. 
Let Ns denote the set of neighboring vertices of S, i.e. Ns = {v E Vl3u E S for 
which (u, v) E E), and let W = V \ (S U Ns). 
We shall show that Dive is a rejecting suborientation of Give, contradicting thus the 
minimality of D, and hence proving the lemma. 
Since D is rejecting, S is not a maximal stable set of G, and thus W ~ 0. Let P C W 
be any maximal stable set of Give. Then S UP  is a maximal stable set of G. Since D 
is a rejecting suborientation of G, P U S is rejected by some vertex u E V \ (S U P). 
We claim that u E W. Since S is not rejected in D, for every vertex v E Ns there 
must be a neighbor w E S for which ~vv~ A. Therefore, none of the vertices of Ns can 
reject S U P, and hence u belongs to W. Thus, by the definition of rejection, u rejects 
P in DIw, too. [] 
Lemma 21. I f  a connected graph G = (V,E) is not core solvable, then it has a 
strongly rejecting, clique acyclic suborientation. 
Proof. Let D = (V,A) be a rejecting and clique acyclic suborientation of G. 
Let us choose now a subset W _c V which is minimal for the property that DIw is 
a rejecting suborientation of Give. Then, according to Lemma 20, Diw is a strongly 
rejecting suborientation of GJw. Since, for any subset S C V the suborientation Dis 
of GIs will obviously be again clique acyclic, the suborientation Dive is also a clique 
acyclic suborientation of Give. Thus, Dive will be both a strongly rejecting and clique 
acyclic suborientation of GI w. 
Let us define now a new suborientation of G. Let W = {wl ..... ws} and let V \  W = 
{UI,V 2 ..... Vn_s} such that every vertex vj has a neighbor in W U {viii > j}. Such a 
labeling of the vertices of V \ W can be obtained e.g. by putting them in decreasing 
order of their distances to the set W. Then, let 
= Alve U {v~ I(vi, vg) E E, i < j} U {v~j I(vi, wj) E E}. (10) 
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It is easy to check that D = (V,A) is a strongly rejecting, clique acyclic suborientation 
of G. [] 
Lemmas 20 and 21 yield the following characterization f kernel solvability. 
Corollary 22. A connected graph G = (V,E) is not kernel solvable if and only if it 
has a strongly rejecting clique acyclic suborientation. 
Even more, Lemma 21 implies the following property of not kernel solvable graphs. 
Lemma 23. I f  the graph G = (V,E) contains a non-kernel solvable induced subgraph, 
then it has a rejecting and clique acyclic suborientation, thus, in particular, G itself 
is not kernel solvable. 
Proof. Let G / ---- (W,E/) be a non-kernel solvable induced connected subgraph of G, 
which obviously exists by the assumption. Then, by Corollary 22 there is a strongly 
rejecting clique acyclic suborientation D- - (W,A)  of G t. 
Let us repeat he construction i the proof of Lemma 21, and build a suborientation 
of G itself, as follows. Let us fix a linear order of the vertices not in W, i.e. let 
V \ W = {Vl ..... Vs}. Let us define then 
A=AU{~i~j [1~<i < j~<s}U{v~ IwE W, and l<~i<~s}. 
It is quite immediate now to see that D = (V,A) is a rejecting and clique acyclic 
suborientation of G. [] 
Let us remark that if G itself is connected in the above lemma, then by choosing 
the appropriate labeling, as in Lemma 21, one can obtain a strongly rejecting 
clique acyclic suborientation of G, too. Let us remark also that the suborientations 
constructed in Example 1 are actually strongly rejecting clique acyclic suborienta- 
tions of the odd holes and anti-holes. This implies immediately the following state- 
ment. 
Corollary 24. I f  the (connected) graph G contains an odd hole or an odd anti-hole, as 
an induced subgraph, then it has a (strongly) rejecting, clique acyclic suborientation, 
thus, in particular, G is not kernel solvable. [] 
The above may suggest hat clique acyclic minimal suborientations always induce a 
strongly rejecting suborientation f an induced odd hole or odd anti-hole. This however 
is not true as the example in Fig. 3 shows. 
Let us note that, by Lemma 17, Conjecture 2 is equivalent to the following conjec- 
ture. 
Conjecture 3. Every blow up of a kernel solvable graph is kernel solvable. 
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• Oriented edge 
Unoriented edge 
Fig. 3. Another example for a minimal, clique acyclic and rejecting (and thus strongly rejecting) suborien- 
tation of a non-perfect graph. 
Proof of equivalence between Conjectures 2 and 3. Let us assume Conjecture 2 
to hold. Then, by Theorem 1 perfectness and kernel solvability are equivalent. 
Thus Conjecture 2 follows by the fact that every blow up of a perfect graph is 
perfect. 
Conversely, if we assume Conjecture 3 to hold, then every graph which has a non- 
kernel solvable blow up must itself be non-kernel solvable. Thus Theorem 2 implies 
now Conjecture 2. [] 
In other words, Conjecture 3 claims that the substitution of  a vertex by an edge 
preserves kemel solvability. Although we cannot prove this, let us remark that some 
other simple graph operations can be shown to preserve kemel solvability. 
It is easy to see e.g. that substituting a vertex by a directed edge is such an operation. 
More precisely, let us obtain G t from G by duplicating a vertex v c V(G) into v ~ 
and v", connect v t and v" to all neighbors of v, and add the directed edge (vt, v"). 
Then, it is easy to see that a clique acyclic rejecting sub-orientation of G" (in which 
the edge (v ~, v") is oriented), induces a clique acyclic rejecting sub-orientation of  G 
itself. 
Let us prove in the next lemma that the substitution of  a vertex by a non-edge is 
also preserving kernel solvability. 
Lemma 25. Let G = (V,E) be a simple 9raph, V = {vl ..... vn}, and let Si, i = 1 ..... n 
be pairwise disjoint subsets. Let furthermore, G ~ = ($1 U . . .  U Sn,U)  be the 9raph 
obtained f rom G by substitutin9 vertex vi by the set Si as a stable set, for  i = 1 ..... n, 
i.e. (x, y)  E E' for  x C Si and y 6 Sj i f  and only i f  i C j and (vi, vj) E E. Then, G is 
not kernel solvable whenever G ~ is not kernel solvable. 
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ProoL Let D ' = (& U • -- U Sn,A') be a clique acyclic, rejecting suborientation of G'. 
Let us define now a suborientation of G as follows: 
A = {~ivj 13y E Sjgx E Si xfiyE A'}. 
Let us remark first that D = (V,A) is obviously a clique acyclic suborientation 
of G, since every clique cycle in D would naturally correspond to a clique cycle 
of D'. 
To see that it is rejecting, let us consider a maximal stable set S of G, and let 
s'=US~. 
i:viCS 
Clearly, S' is a maximal stable set of G', and thus it is rejected by a vertex x in D'. 
It is easy now to verify that if x E Sj, then D must reject S in D. [] 
Using the above lemma we can show that the following, seemingly unrelated state- 
ment is also equivalent with Conjecture 2. 
Conjecture 4. A graph G is kernel solvable if and only if its complement G is kernel 
solvable. 
Proof of equivalence of Conjectures 2 and 4 . Let us assume first that Conjecture 
2 holds. Then, by Theorem 1 perfectness and kernel solvability are equivalent, thus 
Conjecture 4 follows by [21]. 
Let us assume now Conjecture 4 to be true, and let us consider a non-perfect graph 
G. Then its complement, G is also non-perfect (see [21]), and thus G has a blow 
up, ~r which is not kernel solvable, by Theorem 2. Then, by Conjecture 4 the comple- 
ment G'  is also non-kernel solvable, and hence G itself is not-kernel solvable, by 
Lemma 25. [~ 
10. A criterion of g-stability of hypergraphs 
Let us remark finally that the connection between property BSP and perfectness, i.e. 
Lemma 14, can also be generalized in the tbllowing way. 
Given a finite set I let o f  = {Kit j E J}  be a family of subsets of 1. We shall say 
that the family has the Helly property if for any subfamily ,,f~' C off, the members of 
which are pairwise intersecting, all the members of of" have an element in common. 
In other words, if for every j / c  J for which K; N KI ~ 0 whenever j, l E J ' ,  we 
have C~jEj,K j ~ ~. Let us denote furthermore by G,- the intersection graph of of ,  i.e. 
V(G,  ) = J and for j , l  E J  we have ( j , l)  E E (G ,  ) iff K iNK l  ¢ {0. 
Theorem 26. Let off be a family of subsets of a finite set I. The family off U [1] has 
property BSP if and only if o f  has the Helly property and the intersection graph 
G,  is perfect. In other words, the family of  is g-stable if and only if it is normal. 
54 E. Boros. V. Crurvich/Discrete Mathematics 159 (1996) 35~5 
Proof. Let us show first that the Helly property of ~ is necessary for o,~ U [I] to have 
property BSP. For if not, let ~t  = {Kjlj E J '}  be a minimal non-Helly subfamily, i.e. 
for which o,Y'" = {Kjlj E j , ,}  has the Helly property for any proper subset j ,t  C jr.  
Then Nj~j,Kj = 9, and there are elements xj E I, j E J '  such that xj E Kl for every 
j, l E jr ,  / ~ j. Let us define now a weighting w of ~{" U [I] as follows. Let w(Kj) = 1 
for j E J ' ,  and let w(Kj) = 0 otherwise. Furthermore, let w({x}) = I J ' l  - 1 - I{J 
jtIKj ~ x}[ ,  for every x E I. Then w is a balanced weighting of o~f'U [I] of multiplicity 
I J ' l -  1. 
It is easy to see that the support of w does not contain a partition. For this, let us 
observe that w({xj}) = 0 for j E Jr, thus any partition must contain at least one of 
the sets of ~r~. Since the sets of ~ff' are pairwise intersecting, no partition can contain 
two or more of these sets, therefore a partition must contain exactly one, say Kj for 
some j E jr.  But then xj ([ Kj could not be covered by sets of the support of w. This 
proves that the support of the balanced weighting w does not contain a partition, and 
hence it follows by Lemma 13 that ~r U [I] cannot have property BSP. 
Let us associate now to every element i E I a clique C(i) of G~c by setting C(i) = 
{j E JIKj ~ i}. Let us observe next that if ~ has the Helly property, then the 
collection of cliques {C(i)[i E I} contains all maximal cliques of Gx.  
Let us call an element i E ! passive if there is another element i t E ! such that 
the family of sets K E JY" containing i is a proper subfamily of those sets K t E J l  
which contain i t. Let us observe that the restriction of the sets of oY(" on the set of 
non-passive lements yields a family o,~* for which ~*  U [I] has property BSP if and 
only if X U [I] has property BSP. 
The above show that the statement is reduced to the equivalence of the perfectness 
of G~r with the BSP property of ~*  U [I], where ~,Y~* = o,Y~G~r. Thus, by applying 
Lemma 14 and the equivalence (d)¢==~ (e) of Corollary 19, we can conclude our 
proof. [] 
Let us observe that property BSP of the family ~U[ I ]  can be shown to be equivalent 
with the integrality of the associated set-packing polytope, PJc = {xiAx<~l}, where 
A is the (0, 1)-matrix, the columns of which are the characteristic vectors of the sets 
of o,Y ~. Therefore, Theorem 26 is in fact equivalent with Theorem 2 of [22], which 
characterizes normal hypergraphs. 
Let us remark finally that Theorem 26 was rediscovered in game theoretic ontext 
and proved independently in [19,20]. 
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